

S U M M A R Y

The text content is distributed into seven chapters.

[Chapter 1, Destiny, Historicity, and Historical Way of the Bulgarian People after the Emancipation from the Ottoman Empire](#), is devoted to the definition of destiny in the philosophical literature, especially in philosophy of history. The central place is occupied by Heidegger's consideration of destiny in Chapter 5 of Division II of "Being and Time"; also of the connected existentials of choice and historical way (Geschick). Hegel's conception about world-historical peoples and Vasil Prodanov's about overtaking development are considered. At last, the historical way of the Bulgarian people after the Emancipation from the Ottoman Empire is cited as an example.

[Chapter 2, Truth and Destiny after Heidegger](#) considers the connection between the existentials of truth and destiny after Heidegger on the base of four texts – two early (paragraphs from "Being and Time") and two later (from the forties and fifties). "Truth" after Heidegger touches essentially "destiny": truth is e un-hidden-ness, ἀλήθεια, destiny is openness, resolution to be accepted Being-at-fault (Schuldsein) by choice, which repeats, modifies or can even refuse historical continuity. Destiny is not anything existing: there is it (Es gibt, literally, it is given, presented). It happens as events, Being-with, i.e. as sometimes happening Being-with-being, Ereignis, meeting.

[Chapter 3, Destiny of Being](#) extends the existential of destiny from the latter chapter in relation to being itself, which still Heidegger considers historically: being itself has a history, even whether there is God is determined by constitution of being; by this token also truth is fundamentally historized. Again, four texts are considered (two early, both the concluding paragraphs of "Being and Time" and of "Kant and the problem of metaphysics" and two later, "Kant's thesis of being" and "Time and Being"). Accepting history of being, also time in its ground is confirmed. A transition from fundamental ontology to fundamental history is suggested.

[Chapter 4, Destiny as Cognition and Cognition of Destiny](#), is directed – after considering of ontological problems connected to destiny - to questions of its cognition, by which also destiny itself is a kind of cognition. Thereupon, "internal sense" after Kant

is discussed. Equilibrium of mind and recovered its philosophical importance “heart” allows for destiny to be cognized. An idea of fundamental history for ontology is suggested. It goes behind the ground “being” characterizing ontology. Metaphor is a form, which generalizes proposition. It by itself contents a variable ontological direction as proposition is but a particular case when this direction is fixed. Metaphor required an interpretator: an interpretator of proposition is necessary only for choice of the initial principles (axioms). Metaphor is sometimes true: proposition is constantly related to some “external”, “objective” truth. Analogically, poetical thought predicted by Heidegger generalizes logical thinking. Destiny is given, it issues from symbol hidden in the collective. A. Ignatov, P. Tillich, A. Lossev’s viewpoints are discussed, too.

[Chapter 5, Historical Way and Counterfactual Analysis](#) debates the way, by which history may be considered as rather a science for historical choices than for facts. Using such an approach, counterfactual analysis is brought to the forefront weighing alternative unrealized courses of history – choices and ways. We consider as reasons as premises of counterfactual analysis. It allows for any historical way to be rationalized in its proper essence of a become reality, chosen option. The actual, chosen and possible alternatives are compared and equalized.

[Chapter 6, Overtaking Development as a Historical Way](#) is concentrated over P. Tillich’s critique of “progressivism”, over those of R. Kosellek about “time’s shortening” and of A. Ignatov about “time’s acceleration”. A conception of “reflexive secularization” is introduced. Thereupon, the collective viewpoint of a number of Bulgarian philosophers about “overtaking development” is debated. In depth of the latter notion we may gain a fundamentally historical category of overtaking on basis of an analysis of Heidegger’s existentials of Care, Historical way (Geschick) and destiny (Schicksal). Equilibrium between the fundamental-ontological and fundamental-historical is explicated as duality of Care and Historical way (Destiny), of endogeneous and exogeneous time using Braudel’s terms.

[Chapter 7, Historical Time](#) is the concluding last chapter. In it, comparing with Heidegger’s “existential” is introduced “historical existential” as a new form of philosophical reflexion directed to balancing of the existential and the historical.

Substantializing of choice leads to ushering historical existential of information as the ground of the world in its unity of a (human) history and nature – a looming, inconstant, and variable substance of being. It is defined as the measure of quantity and quality of choices and their existential experience. As the philosophical ground of the world, information is correlative or relative to time. “Historical time” – inhomogeneous, irregular, and structured – generalizes the conception of physical time in the corresponding theories. The doctrine of Braudel about long run (“longue durée”), and that of Kosellek about “time’s strata”, the “kairos” of Paul Tillich, the interpretation of Assen Ignatov about time after Heidegger in connexion with Berdiaev’s view about existential time, the idea about embedding of cosmic time in historical and existential time, “non-finity” (or “un-finity”, but not “infinity” of historical time), Jaspers axial time – all of those is considered.

Historical continuity is a basic regularity for the course of history, which may be rationalized by the historical existentials of destiny and historical way. The fast changes are not stable: they are almost always cancelled by the course of history. They are chaotic. They represent fluctuations, deviations from an average, statistic, slow change for a long period: *long run* by term of Peirce, or *longue durée* by that of the Annales School.